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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did Bridlewood Corporation discharge its duty of 
disclosure when its agent, Robert Penton, disclosed to the 
plaintiffs1 agent, Steve Brown, the fact that soil slippage 
existed on the property and the fact that George Adamson, an 
engineer, had examined the slippage and rendered an opinion 
about it? 
2. Did Bridlewood Corporation, as seller of the 
restaurant property, have any obligation to conduct an 
investigation of the soil slippage on the restaurant property 
and, if so, did Bridlewood discharge its obligation? 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was an action for damages that the plaintiffs 
claimed to have suffered as a result of soil slippage on 
restaurant property they purchased from defendant Bridlewood 
Corporation. The plaintiffs alleged that Bridlewood either 
intentionally or negligently misrepresented the character of 
the property or that Bridlewood intentionally concealed from 
them the fact of the soil slippage on the property. The 
plaintiffs have also argued, though it was not alleged in the 
complaint, that the defendant breached a duty to investigate 
the facts surrounding the soil slippage. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a trial to the court, Judge David E. Roth of the 
Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, held that 
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Bridlewoodfs real estate agent, Bob Penton, had adequately 
disclosed the facts surrounding the soil slippage on the 
property. As a result, Judge Roth entered judgment in favor of 
the defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Bridlewood seeks an order of this Court affirming the 
judgment of the trial court. * . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs' statement of facts sets forth in 
detail most of the facts relevant to this appeal. In reality, 
there were few disputed issues of fact at trial, and the 
plaintiffs have accepted the trial court's findings of fact. 
Bridlewood believes, however, that the following additional 
facts are relevant to the points of law that the plaintiffs 
argue in their brief. 
Since the plaintiffs1 claim is for fraudulent 
concealment, the critical facts relate to what Bridlewood, 
.- • ^ -.... 
through its agents, disclosed to the plaintiffs, through their 
agent. The testimony at trial revealed that all of the 
essential information that Bridlewood knew about the condition 
of the restaurant property was disclosed to the plaintiffs' 
agent. The only breakdown in communication occurred between 
the plaintiffs' agent and the plaintiffs themselves. 
The story of the discussions among the parties and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
their agents can get confusing. The following "cast of 
characters" is therefore supplied for the Court's reference: 
Character Role 
Bridlewood Corporation Defendant 
Clinton Frank Bridlewood's president 
Rick Wadman Bridlewood1s first listing agent 
Bob Penton Bridlewood's second listing agent 
George Adamson Engineer who examined the property 
Robert Russo and Plaintiffs 
John Russo 
Steve Brown Plaintiffs' real estate agent 
All of the discussions between the parties occurred 
between their real estate agents; there was no direct contact 
between Bridlewood and the plaintiffs. (R. 191.) The 
plaintiffs' agent, Steve Brown, was a longtime acquaintance of 
the plaintiffs who did much more than merely act as a conduit 
for offers and counteroffers. (R.. 313.) Mr. Brown gave the 
plaintiffs advice about available properties, the price to 
offer for the property, and the terms of the offer. He also 
advised the plaintiffs about the restaurant business in 
general, since Mr. Brown himself had operated a restaurant in 
Ogden. (R. 300.) 
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Bridlewoodfs first agent, Rick Wadman, entered into a 
listing agreement with Bridlewood on August 14, 1980. Mr. 
Wadman's listing was renewed three times, and the last listing 
ended on December 31, 1983. (R. 193.) Early in his listing 
tenure, Mr. Wadman became aware that there was a crack in the 
asphalt on the east side of the restaurant parking lot. That 
crack appeared to Mr. Wadman to be stable until the Summer of 
1983, when Wadman noted additional slippage. (R. 199-200.) 
In order to determine what was causing the apparent 
slippage on the property, Mr. Wadman consulted George Adamson, 
an engineer who had been recommended to Mr. Wadman because of 
his knowledge of soils conditions in the Birch Creek area near 
the restaurant. (R. 208, 212.) Mr. Adamson looked at the 
property with Mr. Wadman and told him that the additional 
slippage had occurred because of saturation from recent heavy 
rainfall. Mr. Adamson told Mr. Wadman that he couldn't predict 
exactly what would happen in the future, but that the soil 
could remain stable for 50 to 100 years if there was no further 
unusual saturation. (R. 213.) 
Mr. Wadman called Mr. Frank in Illinois to tell him 
about his discussion with Mr. Adamson. (R. 214.) Mr. Frank 
himself did not talk to Mr. Adamson. (R. 173.) Thus Mr. 
Frank, and therefore Bridlewood, had no greater knowledge about 
the condition of the property than did Mr. Wadman, since Mr. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Wadman was the source of Bridlewoodfs knowledge of the 
condition. 
Bridlewood listed the property with its second agent, 
Bob Penton, beginning January 1, 1984. (R. 238.) Mr. Penton 
obtained his knowledge about the condition of the property from 
Mr. Wadman. Mr. Wadman told Mr. Penton all of the essential 
information about the condition of the property. Mr. Wadman 
told Mr. Penton that there was a crack in the asphalt, and 
slippage on the east side of the property; that the cement slab 
on which the freezer sat had cracked and fallen because of the 
slippage; and that George Adamson, an engineer, had examined 
the property and opined that it could slip again but that it 
might be stable for 50 to 100 years. (R. 224-5.) Mr. Wadman 
also told Mr. Penton that Clinton Frank of Bridlewood was aware 
of the soil slippage. (R. 255.) At this point Mr. Penton knew 
as much if not more than Mr. Frank knew about the soil 
slippage, and thus had no reason to call Mr. Frank for more 
information. 
Mr. Penton immediately visited the property. (R. 
255.) Although there was snow on the ground that covered the 
crack in the asphalt, Mr. Penton was able to see the area 
underneath the freezer overhang where the cement slab had 
fallen six to eight inches. (R. 257-8.) Mr. Penton could see 
that slippage without bending, stooping, or removing any snow. 
(R. 273-4.) 
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Mr. Penton immediately returned to his office to call 
Steve Brown, the plaintiffs1 agent, to tell him what he had 
seen. (R. 262.) Mr. Penton spoke with Mr. Brown on the 
telephone for 10 to 15 minutes. (R. 263.) Mr. Penton passed 
on to Mr. Brown precisely the same information that Penton had 
received from Mr. Wadman. Mr. Penton told Mr. Brown that he 
had learned of the slippage from Wadman; that he (Penton) had 
visited the property and had seen the soil slippage by the 
freezer; and that George Adamson, the engineer, had examined 
the property and opined that it might remain stable in the 
future. (R. 262-4; 291-2; 304-5.) Mr. Penton told Brown he 
thought the plaintiffs should be informed of these facts. (R. 
263f 276.) Mr. Penton testified that Mr. Brown was concerned 
and that Brown said he would talk to the plaintiffs about the 
slippage and call Penton back. Mr. Penton testified that Mr. 
Brown told him the next day that the plaintiffs did not 
consider the slippage a problem and would go ahead with the 
closing. (R. 265, 277.) 
Mr. Brown in fact never visited the property, never 
called Wadman or the engineer, and never told the plaintiffs 
about his discussion with Penton. (R. 305-6.) John Russo 
testified that he would have been concerned if he had been told 
an engineer had been hired to look at the property, and would 
have gone back to look at the property if he had been told 
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there was soil slippage on the property. (R. 351-2.) Mr. 
Brown conceded at the trial that Penton told him about both the 
soil slippage and the engineer's visit to the property. (R. 
292, 305.) 
The plaintiffs contend that Brown justifiably confused 
the slippage that Mr. Penton described with some drainage 
erosion Brown had seen at the northeast edge of the property. 
(Plaintiffs' Brief at 29.) That erosion, however, was some 20 
feet away from the freezer that Mr. Penton linked to the soil 
slippage. (R. 303.) Moreover, Robert Russo described the 
erosion as a "small spot" that was a "minor, very minor, 
problem." (R. 319, 326.) That description, of course, is 
wholly inconsistent with a problem serious enough for an 
engineer to look at and for Penton to make a special call to 
Brown to disclose it. 
Bridlewoodfs president, Clinton Frank, had visited the 
property in July, 1983, but did not return to Utah untij. well 
after the closing of the transaction. (R. 179.) The slippage 
line in the asphalt had been visible to Mr. Frank when he 
visited the property in July. (R. 167-8.) Even after Mr. 
Penton acquired the listing in January, 1984, Mr. Frank assumed 
that the condition would be visible to anyone who visited the 
property, (R. 182.) Mr. Frank testified that he did not 
intend to conceal the condition of the property from anyone. 
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(R. 177, 190.) Indeed, it was Mr. Frank who had decided not to 
repave the area of the asphalt crack when that was considered 
as a solution to the asphalt slippage months before the 
plaintiffs' purchase of the property. (R. 228-9.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Roth correctly held that Bridlewood did not 
conceal any facts about the property* Bridlewoodfs real estate 
agent disclosed to the plaintiffs1 agent everything Bridlewood 
knew about the property. The plaintiffs testified that they 
would have been concerned and would have investigated if they 
had known those facts. The plaintiffs1 agent, however, failed 
to reveal to the plaintiffs any of the facts he had learned 
from Bridlewoodfs agent. Bridlewood cannot be held responsible 
for the concealment by the plaintiffs1 own agent. 
The plaintiffs1 effort to impose liability on 
Bridlewood on the basis of a failure to investigate the soil 
slippage on the property is misplaced for two reasons. First, 
the claim is hot supported by the facts. When Bridlewood's 
real estate agents became aware of slippage on the property, 
they examined the property, hired an engineer with expertise in 
soils problems, and obtained the engineer's opinion about the 
condition of the property. All of this information was 
disclosed to the plaintiffs' agent. 
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Second, the duty of investigation that the plaintiffs 
attempt to impose on Bridlewood is a duty that is unique to 
listing brokers of residential real estate. The duty has never 
been imposed on a seller of real property, and it has never 
been applied to the sale of commercial real estate. 
Bridlewood's only duty was to disclose what it had learned 
about the property, and it discharged that duty. 
ARGUMENT 
Although the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint 
claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation and for 
fraudulent concealment, they take issue on this appeal only 
with the trial court's holding that there was no fraudulent 
concealment. The plaintiffs have also argued the theory that 
Bridlewood9s listing agent failed to investigate the nature of 
the soil slippage on the property. The plaintiffs accept Judge 
Roth's findings of fact and challenge only his conclusions of 
law. As is discussed more fully below, Judge Roth's ruling was 
correct on all of the issues. 
I. JUDGE ROTH CORRECTLY HELD THAT BRIDLEWOOD'S DUTY OF 
DISCLOSURE WAS DISCHARGED WHEN ITS REAL ESTATE AGENT 
DISCLOSED TO THE PLAINTIFFS' REAL ESTATE AGENT THE FACTS 
ABOUT THE SOIL SLIPPAGE ON THE RESTAURANT PROPERTY. 
The facts adduced at trial can support no conclusion 
other than that Bridlewood's agent discharged Bridlewood's 
obligation of disclosure. As the plaintiffs point out in their 
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brief, the negotiations and closing of the transaction were 
conducted solely through the parties1 real estate agents. The 
plaintiffs had never spoken with Clinton Frank or any other 
Bridlewood representative before this case was filed. 
Therefore, the focus of this case is on the knowledge of the 
parties1 agents and their discussions. 
Rick Wadman, Bridlewood's first real estate agent, was 
the source of Bridlewood's knowledge about the soil slippage. 
Mr. Wadman investigated the slippage by hiring an engineer, 
George Adamson, who examined the property. Mr. Adamson told 
Mr. Wadman that although the slippage appeared to have 
stablized as of the time of his examination (July, 1983), it 
could slip further if additional heavy rain saturation 
occurred. This was the very information that Mr. Wadman passed 
on to Bob Penton, Bridlewood?s second real estate agent. 
Mr. Penton immediately examined the property himself 
and passed on the information he had received to the 
plaintiffs1 agent, Steve Brown. It was at that point that the 
only breakdown in communication occurred in this case. Mr. 
Brown decided not to do anything with the knowledge he had 
received from Mr. Penton. He didn't visit the property. He 
didn't tell his clients about the slippage. He didn't tell 
them about the engineer's examination and conclusions. Mr. 
Brown didn't tell the plaintiffs anything about his 
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conversation with Mr. Penton. The plaintiffs testified that 
they would have investigated further if they had been told 
about the slippage and the engineer's examination. 
In order to prove a case of fraudulent concealment, 
the plaintiffs must prove that the defendant knowingly or 
recklessly concealed a latent condition of the property; that 
the latent condition existed at the time of the sale and would 
have been material to the plaintiffs' decision to purchase; and 
that the defendant concealed the condition for the purpose of 
inducing the plaintiffs to buy the property. Sugarhouse 
Finance Co. v Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980). The 
plaintiffs must prove each of these elements of fraud by f,clear 
and convincing" evidence. Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 
954 (Utah 1978); Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 143, 247 P.2d 
273, 274 (1952). 
The plaintiffs in this case not only failed to prove 
that Bridlewood had any intent to conceal anything from them, 
but they failed to establish the very foundation of the claim: 
a concealment by Bridlewood. The only concealment in this case 
was Steve Brown's failure to tell his clients what he had 
learned from Bridlewood1s agent. The plaintiffs' argument that 
Bridlewood should have foreseen Brown's concealment is both 
ludicrous and inconsistent with their concession that they are 
bound by their agent's acts and omissions. 
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Judge Roth correctly held that Steve Brown's knowledge 
was chargeable to the plaintiffs, and that once Brown was made 
aware of the soil slippage and the engineer's examination and 
opinion, he should have told the plaintiffs what he knew. The 
plaintiffs and their agent were then obligated to conduct such 
further investigation as might have been necessary to inform 
themselves of the nature of the slippage. Cheever v. 
Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah 1978). "'Knowledge which is 
sufficient to lead a prudent person to inquire about the matter 
when it could have been ascertained conveniently, constitutes 
notice of whatever the inquiry would have disclosed, and will 
be regarded as knowledge of the facts. fff Peterson v. Koch 
Industries, Inc., 684 F.2d 667, 671 (10th Cir. 1982) (citation 
omitted). 
Judge Roth's conclusions of law are consistent with 
precedent from this Court. For example, in Cole v. Parker, 5 
Utah 2d 263, 300 P.2d 623 (1956), this Court upheld the trial 
court's denial of the plaintiff's claim for rescission of a 
real estate purchase contract. The plaintiff had claimed that 
the defendant failed to disclose certain facts about the water 
supply to the agricultural property in question. Before the 
plaintiff had purchased the property, the defendant-vendor had 
shown the plaintiff around the property and had taken the 
plaintiff to see the source of the creek that supplied water to 
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the property. The defendant also told the plaintiff that the 
creek could deliver more water to the property if it were lined 
along a portion of its course. 
After taking possession of the property, the plaintiff 
discovered that there was a fault along the course of the creek 
into which much of the water supply was lost, resulting in what 
the plaintiff deemed an insufficient water supply to the land. 
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had taken him on a 
roundabout tour of the land for the purpose of concealing the 
existence of the fault; that the existence of the fault was not 
reasonably discoverable; and that the defendant's failure to 
disclose it constituted a fraudulent concealment. 
This Court upheld the trial court's judgment for the 
defendant on the ground that the defendant had made adequate 
disclosure of the condition of the water supply to the property. 
While we agree with plaintiffs9 cited authorities 
that a material nondisclosure or a half-truth may 
be the basis for an action on fraud as well as a 
positive representation, . . . we do not agree 
that because the seller did not discuss with 
particularity the cause of the loss of water, the 
buyer is at liberty to rescind his contract. . . . 
"It was [the buyers1] duty to make such 
investigation and inquiry as reasonable care under 
the circumstances would dictate . . . ." 
5 Utah 2d at 266, 300 P.2d at 625 (citing Lewis v. White, 2 
Utah 2d 101, 269 P.2d 865 (1954)). 
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In the present case, the plaintiffs acquired 
constructive knowledge, through their agent, that the property 
they were about to buy had experienced soil slippage and that 
the seller had retained an engineer to examine the slippage 
condition. At that point the duty of investigation and 
disclosure shifted to the plaintiffs' agent. The parties agree 
that Steve Brown breached that duty.. The plaintiffs chose not 
to sue Mr. Brown, their longtime acquaintance, but that 
omission does not change the fact that the only failure to 
investigate and disclose was his. Judge Roth correctly held 
that Bridlewood is not responsible for Brown's failure to 
disclose the slippage condition to the plaintiffs, or for the 
plaintiffs' consequent failure to investigate and inform 
themselves about the condition. 
II. BRIDLEWOOD DISCHARGED WHATEVER DUTY IT HAD TO INVESTIGATE 
THE FACTS ABOUT THE SOIL SLIPPAGE ON THE RESTAURANT 
PROPERTY. 
As is discussed more fully below, the duty of 
investigation that the plaintiffs seek to impose on Bridlewood 
is a duty that the plaintiffs concede has been accepted in only 
two states. Even in those states, the duty is unique to real 
estate brokers. The theory is misapplied to Bridlewood, the 
seller of the property in the present case. The simplest 
response to the claim, however, is that Bridlewood and its 
agents conducted a sufficient investigation to have discharged 
such an obligation even if it existed. 
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When Bridlewoodfs first agent, Rick Wadman, saw 
evidence of soil slippage on the property, he didn't stand pat 
with that knowledge; he retained George Adamson, an engineer 
who had been recommended to Mr. Wadman because of his 
experience and knowledge of soils problems in the vicinity of 
the restaurant property. Mr. Adamson examined the property and 
told Mr. Wadman that it was difficult to predict what would 
happen in the future, but that the property could remain stable 
for the next 50 to 100 years. 
When Mr. Wadman conveyed this same information to Bob 
Penton, Bridlewood's next listing agent, Mr. Penton also 
investigated the situation. Mr. Penton immediately visited the 
property and examined the area of worst slippage that Mr. 
Wadman had described, under the freezer at the back of the 
building. Mr. Penton saw the very slippage that Mr. Wadman had 
described to him. Mr. Penton immediately called the 
plaintiffs1 agent, Mr. Brown, and conveyed to Brown the 
*- •- -
contents of his conversation with Mr. Wadman and related what 
he had seen when he visited the property. It was at this point 
that any investigation or disclosure ceased. Mr. Brown neither 
investigated the problem nor disclosed it to his clients. 
Thus, to the extent that a duty of investigation could be 
applied to a seller of commercial real estate, Bridlewood and 
its agents discharged that obligation. 
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The plaintiffs' argument is more fundamentally flawed, 
however, because it is misapplied to the defendant in this 
case. The California case on which the plaintiffs rely so 
heavily, Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 
Cal. Rptr. 383, 391 (1984), holds that a listing broker of 
residential real estate owes a duty to prospective purchasers 
of the property to exercise reasonable care to disclose any 
facts materially affecting the value of the property that the 
broker could discover through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence. The theory of that case does not apply to 
Bridlewood for two reasons. 
First, and most obviously, the duty that the 
California appellate court imposed was unique to the listing 
broker, and was not applied to the seller of the property. 
Neither the Easton case nor any other case cited by the 
plaintiffs has extended the duty beyond the broker to the 
seller of the property. Indeed, this Court has cited Easton 
as one of the "cases from California which focus on the status 
and responsibilities of real estate brokers . . . ." 
Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 795 n.l (Utah 1986) (emphasis 
added). 
The reason the duty of investigation is limited to 
brokers is apparent from the California court's reasoning in 
Easton* The court reasoned that real estate brokers are often 
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in a very commanding position with respect to prospective 
buyers of residential property; buyers usually have a relative 
lack of knowledge and experience in real estate transactions 
and therefore expect the broker to protect their interests. 
199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. As a result, the court concluded that 
the relationship between a real estate broker and a prospective 
buyer is one of trust and confidence that requires extra 
vigilance by the broker on the buyer's behalf. Id. The court 
also relied on the fact that realtors are subject to a written 
code of ethics that requires them "to discover adverse factors 
that a reasonably competent and diligent investigation would 
disclose." 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389. 
The seller of the property, by contrast, owes no 
fiduciary duty to the buyer, Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 
268, 300 P.2d 623, 626 (1956); and has no professional 
obligation to investigate on the buyer's behalf. The court in 
Easton imposed the duty of investigation only on the broker, 
and specifically distinguished cases in which sellers of 
property had been held liable for fraudulent misrepresentation 
or concealment. 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390-1. This Court has also 
distinguished the limited duty of disclosure imposed on the 
seller of real estate from the broader duty of care that a real 
. estate agent owes to prospective purchasers. Dugan v. Jones« 
615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980). 
The second reason why the Easton theory is misapplied 
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to Bridlewood is that the Easton court itself limited its 
holding to transactions involving residential real estate: 
We express no opinion here whether a broker's 
obligation to conduct: an inspection for defects for 
the benefit of the buyer applies to the sale of 
commercial real estate. Unlike the residential 
home buyer who is often unrepresented by a broker, 
or who is effectively unrepresented because of the 
problems of dual agency [citations omitted], a 
purchaser of commercial real estate is likely to 
be more experienced and sophisticated in his 
dealings in real estate and is usually represented 
by an agent who represents only the buyer's 
interest. [citation omitted.] 
199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 n.8 (emphasis added). 
The court's reasoning applies squarely to the present 
case. The plaintiffs were purchasing commercial real estate 
for the purpose of operating a restaurant business on it. The 
plaintiffs were experienced businessmen who had bought and sold 
real property before. Most importantly, the plaintiffs1 
interests were being protected - - or were supposed to have 
been protected - - by their own real estate agent, who was 
advising them about price, terms, the property, and even about 
the restaurant business its^Lf. Jttius, even if this Court were 
to adopt the California appellate court's expansion of 
negligence liability for brokers, that theory wouldn't apply 
even to Bridlewoodfs listing agent in this case. The theory 
certainly doesnft apply to Bridlewood. 
Finally, even if the Easton theory could be applied 
to Bridlewood's listing agent in this case, and even if 
Bridlewood's listing agent hadn't discharged his obligation of 
.ia. 
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investigation, Bridlewood could not be held responsible for its 
agent's failure to discharge a duty that is unique to the 
agent. While it is true that a principal may be responsible 
for its agent's acts or omissions, those acts or omissions must 
be within the scope of the agent's authority. Under the 
holding of the Easton case, however, the duty of investigation 
was imposed only on the broker, and not on the seller of the 
property. If a listing broker failed to make a reasonable 
investigation under that theory, he would be breaching his own 
duty and not any duty that he was performing on behalf of the 
seller. The plaintiffs cannot bootstrap the alleged failure of 
Bridlewoodfs agent to discharge his own duty into a claim of 
negligence against Bridlewood itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Bridlewood discharged whatever obligation it had to 
investigate the soil slippage on the property and to disclose 
it to the plaintiffs. The only breakdown in investigation and 
disclosure was between the plaintiffs and their own agent. For 
these reasons, Bridlewood respectfully requests that the Court 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
DATED this «ffi^day of ^2Li^OL^t 1987. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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